CONVERTIBLE BONDS IN A DEFAULTABLE DIFFUSION MODEL
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Market discipline—exerted at the funding node—was, in principle, supposed to control moral hazard at the lending node. However, incentives for doing so by appropriately pricing risk also weakened. First, because for conforming loans, correctly perceived implicit Federal government guarantees extended to the GSEs meant that banks could substantially reduce capital costs by substituting essentially risk free GSE debt for mortgages. Second, because the credit risk of non-conforming loans targeted for securitization was systematically underestimated by credit ratings agencies (CRAs) and investors. Third, because of the subjective, and yet remarkably uniform, low likelihood assigned by market participants to a break in...
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CONVERTIBLE BONDS IN A DEFAULTABLE DIFFUSION MODEL
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CONVERTIBLE BONDS IN A DEFAULTABLE DIFFUSION MODEL
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