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COUNTERPARTY RISK FOR CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS

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Consistent with real-life credit-card and subprime mortgage contracts but (we argue) inconsistent with natural specifications of rational time-consistent theories, in the competitive equilibrium of our model firms offer seemingly cheap credit to be repaid quickly, but introduce large penalties for falling behind this front-loaded repayment schedule. The contracts are designed so that borrowers who underestimate their taste for immediate gratification both pay the penalties and repay in an ex ante suboptimal back-loaded manner more often than they predict or prefer. To make matters worse, the same misprediction leads nonsophisticated consumers to underestimate the cost of credit and borrow too much—despite borrowing being for future consumption....
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COUNTERPARTY RISK FOR CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS

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