Does manager ability influence prospectus earnings quality and IPO underpricing
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Prior literature suggests that manager ability influences several factors, including financial reporting quality, key to the bargaining power of an issuing firm during their initial public offering (IPO). However, we also know that high ability managers are better able to engage in and conceal opportunistic behavior which may dampen any positive effects their abilities have in the IPO process. Given the conflicting affect that managerial ability may have on financial reporting and firm performance in the IPO setting.
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Does manager ability influence prospectus earnings quality and IPO underpricing
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Does manager ability influence prospectus earnings quality and IPO underpricing
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