No internal timer, battery.No keyboard, display, network interface.Current generation:μ-processor: 16-bits, 10MHz. RAM: 4K. ROM: 100K for code storage. E2PROM (105 updates ): 64K for data storage. I/O: serial (9600 bps), Contactless protocols: MiFare, FeliCa, Calypso.
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Smart cards a fascinating and fruitful adventure Smart cards a fascinating and fruitful adventureNguyen Quang HuyGemalto Technology & Innovation Smart Cards in the our life Secure transaction (banking, pay-TV) Telecom (SIM/USIM/RUIM, M2M, convergence, M-TV, M-banking, M- ticket) Control Access (physical and logical resource) E-citizen (e-passport, e-ID, e-Heath, e-driving license, ..) 2Smart Card HW 25 mm2 No internal timer, battery No keyboard, display, network interface Current generation µ-processor: 16-bits, Smart Card SW Proprietary architecture Undisclosed specification Tedious application development Closed configuration: no application can be added after issuance Open architecture Open specification High-level programming languages Post-issuance applications are available Some open architectures Java Card MULTOS .NET Card Basic Card 4 Example: Java Card Introduced by Schlumberger in 1996 Leading open multi-applicative architecture >5 billions Java-embedded cards issued Applications (applets) developed in Java JC Firewall Applet 1 Applet 2 I/O command Card Manager API in Java Native Java Card Virtual Machine API Operating System Integrated Circuit 5Security threats No battery Card tearing (or power failure ) may cause inconsistency data No internal timer Logging for post-mortem analysis is not possible No keyboard, display, network device secure usage environment Payment terminals (POS and ATM): security certification Security of PC and handset: keyboard logger, false display (phishing), etc Contactless interface Cardholder is not aware of malicious actions Physically owned by attackers Vulnerable to both logical and physical attacks 6Attacks Logical attacks: use I/O commands to exploit SW vulnerabilities buffer overflow, type confusion, covert channels, protocol attacks, etc Physical attacks: use physical phenomenon to exploit SW/HW vulnerabilities Invasive attacks: destructive and require specific logistics HW reverse-engineering; disabling HW security features, etc Non invasive attacks: affordable logistics – Side-channel: use the emitted signals (power consumption, execution time) to guess the secret (keys, PIN) Execution signature (E2PROM update, DES rounds, etc) may leak secret – Fault-injection attacks: use physical means (infrared heat, laser, X-ray) to flip some bits in the memory Modify code and runtime control flow, data: the consequence is hardly predictable Combined attacks 7Counter-measures and beyond Detection HW: (shield-removal, temperature, frequency, laser, light) sensors SW: checksum, fault-trap Protection HW: memory/bus encryption, redundancy, error-correcting code SW: transaction mechanism (anti-tearing), random noise, protection of control flow Auditing HW: security registers SW: fault-counters, security exception Reaction Muting (infinite loop) and clearing RAMNo counter-measure is perfectTrade-off between security and performance (tender eligibility criterion) Use of mathematical techniques: formal methods 8 Mathematically proven security assurances9Vietnam: smart card deployment Mobile telecom Low-end cards: Dosmetic industry Small market implies small players Few smart cards manufacturers MK Technology JSC: 20 milions smart cards delivered in 2008 Main products: SIM, USIM, RUIM – Sale representative of foreign products Dosmetic share in final products – Card personalization for final clients – A first Vietnamese smart card OS ? MKCos (Sao Khue 2008) Even fewer application developers Vietnamizing imported applications 11Joining the adventure Expanding dosmetic market by SIM-based attractive applications e.g., M-payment, online payment Value-added applications on mobile network M-ticket for publi ...