CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BANKING REGULATION
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Adverse selection arises from different borrowers having different probabilities of repayment. Therefore, to maximise expected return, the bank would like to only lend to borrowers with a high probability of repayment. In order to determine who the good borrowers are, the bank can use the interest rate as a screening device. Unfortunately those who are willing to pay high interest rates may be bad borrowers because they perceive their probability of repayment to be low. Therefore, as interest rates rise, the average “riskiness” of borrowers increases, hence expected profits are lower. The behaviour of the borrower...
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BANKING REGULATION
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BANKING REGULATION
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